

UBC Department of Philosophy Colloquium

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Self-Predication, Other Predication, Generality and Action

Abstract:

Anscombe and Lewis taught that the first person must be understood as a feature of the 'act' of thought, not its 'content'. I will suggest that something like Anscombe's version of the theory is more palatable since it permits extension to the 'second personal' phenomena of importance to ethics. A peculiar feature of her view is that it necessitates a diversification of 'acts' of belief and knowledge - it does not 'standardize' in Lewis' sense. This seemingly radical move will be defended with a discussion of the remarks of Frege and Russell on what we call 'free variables' and their role in our post-Gentzen textbooks. This in fact already involves an implicit formal diversification of *acts* belief or knowledge. Once one is accustomed to taking this step one is in a position to better understand the agent's self-knowledge in action and of the apprehension a pair of agents has of various first-and-second personal phenomena like promises and discourses involving claims of right.

FRIDAY, November 3 BUCH A103 4:00 – 6.00

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