Autism, Aspect-Blindness, and Aspect-Perception

This talk examines the appeal, by philosophers, to Wittgenstein's notion of "aspect-blindness" to illuminate our understanding of autistic perception and social cognition. I articulate and assess different ways of understanding what it might mean to say that autists are aspect-blind. While more attention to the perceptual dimensions of autism is a welcome development in philosophical explorations of the condition, I argue that there are significant problems with attributing aspect-blindness to autists. The empirical basis for the attribution of aspect-blindness to autists is questionable, but even if it turns out that future empirical work on autistic perception and social cognition decisively supports the attribution of some forms of aspect-blindness to autists, the descriptive and explanatory fruitfulness of using the notion of aspect-blindness is limited in important ways. To better capture autistic experience, we should broaden our framework to include conceptualizing autists as engaging in forms of aspect-perception.

FRIDAY, February 9th BUCH A103 4:00 – 6:00